After the fall of the communist Najibullah-regime in 1992, the Afghan political parties agreed on a peace and power-sharing agreement (the Peshawar Accords). The Peshawar Accords created the Islamic State of Afghanistan and appointed an interim government for a transitional period. According to Human Rights Watch:
The sovereignty of Afghanistan was vested formally in the Islamic State of Afghanistan, an entity created in April 1992, after the fall of the Soviet-backed Najibullah government. […] With the exception of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami, all of the parties […] were ostensibly unified under this government in April 1992. […] Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami, for its part, refused to recognize the government for most of the period discussed in this report and launched attacks against government forces and Kabul generally. […] Shells and rockets fell everywhere.[80]
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was directed, funded and supplied by the Pakistani army.[81] Afghanistan analyst Amin Saikal concludes in his book Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival:
Pakistan was keen to gear up for a breakthrough in Central Asia. […] Islamabad could not possibly expect the new Islamic government leaders […] to subordinate their own nationalist objectives in order to help Pakistan realize its regional ambitions. […] Had it not been for the ISI’s logistic support and supply of a large number of rockets, Hekmatyar’s forces would not have been able to target and destroy half of Kabul.[82]
There was no time for the interim government to create working government departments, police units or a system of justice and accountability. Saudi Arabia and Iran also armed and directed Afghan militias.[65] A publication by the George Washington University describes:
[O]utside forces saw instability in Afghanistan as an opportunity to press their own security and political agendas.[83]
According to Human Rights Watch, numerous Iranian agents were assisting the Shia Hezb-i Wahdat forces of Abdul Ali Mazari, as Iran was attempting to maximize Wahdat’s military power and influence.[65][80][84] Saudi Arabia was trying to strengthen the Wahhabite Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and his Ittihad-i Islami faction.[65][80] Atrocities were committed by individuals of the different factions while Kabul descended into lawlessness and chaos as described in reports by Human Rights Watch and the Afghanistan Justice Project.[80][85] Again, Human Rights Watch writes:
Rare ceasefires, usually negotiated by representatives of Ahmad Shah Massoud, Sibghatullah Mojaddedi or Burhanuddin Rabbani (the interim government), or officials from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), commonly collapsed within days.[80]
The main forces involved during that period in Kabul, northern, central and eastern Afghanistan were the Hezb-i Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar directed by Pakistan, the Hezb-i Wahdat of Abdul Ali Mazari directed by Iran, the Ittehad-i Islami of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf supported by Saudi Arabia, the Junbish-i Milli of Abdul Rashid Dostum backed by Uzbekisten, the Harakat-i Islami of Hussain Anwari and the Shura-i Nazar operating as the regular Islamic State forces (as agreed upon in the Peshawar Accords) under the defense ministry of Ahmad Shah Massoud.
Meanwhile southern Afghanistan was neither under the control of foreign-backed militias nor the interim government in Kabul, which had no hands in the affairs of southern Afghanistan during that time. Southern Afghanistan was ruled by Gul Agha Sherzai. The southern city of Kandahar was a centre of lawlessness, crime and atrocities fuelled by complex Pashtun tribal rivalries.[86] In 1994, the Taliban (a movement originating from Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-run religious schools for Afghan refugees in Pakistan) also developed in Afghanistan as a politico-religious force, reportedly in opposition to the tyranny of the local governor.[86] Mullah Omar started his movement with fewer than 50 armed madrassah students in his hometown of Kandahar.[86] As Gulbuddin Hekmatyar remained unsuccessful in conquering Kabul, Pakistan started its support to the Taliban.[65][87] Many analysts like Amin Saikal describe the Taliban as developing into a proxy force for Pakistan’s regional interests which the Taliban decline.[65] In 1994 the Taliban took power in several provinces in southern and central Afghanistan.
In 1995 the Hezb-i Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the Iranian-backed Hezb-i Wahdat as well as Rashid Dostum’s Junbish forces were defeated militarily in the capital Kabul by forces of the interim government under Massoud who subsequently tried to initiate a nationwide political process with the goal of national consolidation and democratic elections, also inviting the Taliban to join the process.[88] The Taliban declined.[8
Military assets of the Afghan communists[edit]
After the Soviet withdrawal in February 1989, the U.S. intelligence agencies expected the PDPA regime to collapse within three to six months.[4]
However, this estimation did not take into account several assets available to the government. The first of these was the large quantities of military hardware donated by the Soviet Union. In 1989, the army and pro-government militiasstill had 1568 tanks, 828 armoured personnel carriers, 4880 artillery pieces, 126 modern fighter-bombers and 14 attack helicopters. Also, the DRA continued to receive massive aid from the Soviet Union, valued between two and six billion dollars a year, and Soviet military advisors were still present in Afghanistan.[5] The government forces also came to rely on the use of large quantities of Scud missiles: between 1988 and 1992 more than 2000 of these were fired inside Afghanistan, the largest amount of ballistic missiles used since World War II. This considerable amount of firepower was sufficient to keep the mujahideen at bay.
Another strength of the DRA were the pro-government militias, of which the most effective was Abdul Rashid Dostum’s Jozjani militia, officially called the 53rd Infantry Division. Numbering 40,000 men drawn from the Uzbek minority, it took its orders directly from Najibullah, who used it as a strategic reserve. After 1989, this force was the only one capable of carrying out offensive operations.[6]
Meanwhile, some of the mujahideen benefited from expanded foreign military support from the United States, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, China, and other nations. The primary beneficiary of U.S. support, delivered through its middleman Pakistan, was Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The primary beneficiaries of Saudi support, especially financial one, were Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and Jalaluddin Haqqani who had had strong contacts to Arab fighters in the war against the Soviets. The U.S. provided Ahmad Shah Massoud with close to no support despite the Wall Street Journal calling him “the Afghan who won the cold war” and was primarily responsible for the mujahideen victory. Part of the reason why he still got only minor support was that the U.S. permitted its funding and arms distribution to be administered by Pakistan, which favored Gulbuddin Hekmatyar who considered himself the archenemy of Massoud. Massoud was also seen as “too independent”. Primary advocates for still supporting Massoud instead were State Department’s Edmund McWilliams and Peter Tomsen, who were on the ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Others included two Heritage Foundation foreign policy analysts, Michael Johns and James A. Phillips, both of whom championed Massoud as the Afghan resistance leader most worthy of U.S. support under the Reagan Doctrine.[7][8] During the Sino-Soviet split, strained relations between China and Soviet Russia resulted in bloody border clashes and mutual backing for the opponents enemies. China and Afghanistan had neutral relations with each other during the King’s rule. When the pro Soviet Afghan Communists seized power in Afghanistan in 1978, relations between China and the Afghan communists quickly turned hostile. The Afghan pro Soviet communists supported China’s enemies in Vietnam and blamed China for supporting Afghan anti communist militants. China responded to the Soviet war in Afghanistan by supporting the Afghan mujahideen and ramping up their military presence near Afghanistan in Xinjiang. China acquired military equipment from America to defend itself from Soviet attack.[9] The Chinese People’s Liberation Army trained and supported the Afghan mujahideen during the war. The training camps were moved from Pakistan into China itself. Anti-aircraft missiles, rocket launchers and machine guns, valued at hundreds of millions, were given to the mujahideen by the Chinese. Chinese military advisors and army troops were present with the Mujahidin during training.[10]
Battle of Jalalabad[edit]
By the spring of 1989, the Afghan government showed no signs of falling apart, and the American and Pakistan supporters of some of the mujahideen decided to hasten its demise. An operation was planned, under the impulsion ofU.S. ambassador to Pakistan Robert B. Oakley, and the Prime Minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhutto, to capture Jalalabad. The Americans and the Pakistanis both wanted a conventional victory, each for their own reasons. The Americans wished to humiliate the Marxists, and send them out of Afghanistan “clinging to their helicopters”, and thus avenge the American defeat in Vietnam. Pakistani wished to retaliate against the Soviet Union as the latter had long unconditionally supported the former’s regional rival, India. Upon conclusion of the battle, Pakistan intended to install a new government under Gulbuddin Hekmatyar with its provisional capital based in Jalalabad.[11] The Pakistan-backed Afghan Interim Government included Gulbuddin Hekmatyar as Prime Minister and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf as Foreign Minister. The central organizer of the offensive on the Pakistani side was Lieutenant-General Hamid Gul,Director-General of the ISI.
Battle of Jalalabad[edit]
By the spring of 1989, the Afghan government showed no signs of falling apart, and the American and Pakistan supporters of some of the mujahideen decided to hasten its demise. An operation was planned, under the impulsion ofU.S. ambassador to Pakistan Robert B. Oakley, and the Prime Minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhutto, to capture Jalalabad. The Americans and the Pakistanis both wanted a conventional victory, each for their own reasons. The Americans wished to humiliate the Marxists, and send them out of Afghanistan “clinging to their helicopters”, and thus avenge the American defeat in Vietnam. Pakistani wished to retaliate against the Soviet Union as the latter had long unconditionally supported the former’s regional rival, India. Upon conclusion of the battle, Pakistan intended to install a new government under Gulbuddin Hekmatyar with its provisional capital based in Jalalabad.[11] The Pakistan-backed Afghan Interim Government included Gulbuddin Hekmatyar as Prime Minister and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf as Foreign Minister. The central organizer of the offensive on the Pakistani side was Lieutenant-General Hamid Gul,Director-General of the ISI.
Battle begins[edit]
Involved in the operation were forces of Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i Islami, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf’s Ittihad-i Islami and Arab fighters, totalling 10,000 men. The attack began on March 5, 1989, and went well at first for the mujahideen, who captured the village of Samarkhel and the Jalalabad airfield. When government troops started to surrender, however, they, along with unarmed civilians, were tortured and executed by Hekmatyar’s and Sayyaf’s forces, making the option of surrender impossible for the communists who then fought harder.[citation needed] Consequently, the attacking forces were soon blocked by the main Afghan army positions held by the 11th Division, that were protected bybunkers, barbed wire and minefields. The government troops could count on intensive air support, as the Afghan air force flew up to 100 to 120 sorties a day over the battlefield. An-12 transport aircraft, modified to carry bombs, flew at high altitude out of range of the Stinger missiles used by the mujahideen; cluster bombs were used intensively.
Three Scud firing batteries, deployed around Kabul and manned by Soviet troops fired more than 400 missiles in support of the Jalalabad garrison. Despite their imprecision, these weapons had a severe effect on the morale of the mujahideen, who could do nothing to prevent them.[12] By the middle of May, they had made no headway against the defenses of Jalalabad, and were running low on ammunition. In July, they were unable to prevent the Afghan Army from recapturing Samarkhel, and Jalalabad was still firmly in the hands of Najibullah’s government. The mujahideen suffered an estimated 3,000 casualties during this battle.[13] An estimated number of 12,000 – 15,000 civilians were killed, while 10,000 had fled the fighting.[14]
Aftermath[edit]
Contrary to U.S. and Pakistani expectations, this battle proved that the Afghan Army could fight without Soviet help, and greatly increased the confidence of government supporters. Conversely, the morale of the mujahideen involved in the attack slumped and many local commanders of Hekmatyar and Sayyaf concluded truces with the government.[15] In the words of Brigadier-General Mohammed Yousaf, an officer of the ISI, “the jihad [meaning the plans for Hekmatyar to be installed as prime minister] never recovered from Jalalabad”.[12] Both the Pakistani and the United States governments were frustrated with the outcome. As a result of this failure, General Hamid Gul was immediately sacked by Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and replaced with General Shamsur Rahman Kallu as the Director-General of the ISI. Kallu pursued a more classical policy of support to the Afghan guerillas.[12] The government forces further proved their worth in April 1990, during an offensive against a fortified complex at Paghman. After a heavy bombardment and an assault that lasted until the end of June, the Afghan army, spearheaded by Dostum’s militia, was able to clear the mujahideen entrenchments.[13]
Domestic Criticism[edit]
The Jalalabad operation was seen as a grave mistake by some mujahideen leaders such as Ahmad Shah Massoud and Abdul Haq, who considered that the mujahideen did not have the capacity to capture a major city in conventional warfare.[16] Neither Massoud nor Haq had participated in the attack on Jalalabad. Massoud even said it was by BBC radio that he learned about the operation.[17] Haq advocated the pursuit of coordinated guerilla warfare, that would gradually weaken the communist regime and cause its collapse through internal divisions. Abdul Haq was also quoted as asking: “How is that we Afghans, who never lost a war, must take military instructions from the Pakistanis, who never won one?”[14] Ahmad Shah Massoud criticized the go-it-alone attitude of Pakistan and their Afghan followers stating: “The damage caused by our [meaning the mujahideen forces] lack of a unified command is obvious. There is a total lack of coordination, which means we are not launching simultaneous offensives on different fronts. As a result the government can concentrate its resources and pick us off one by one. And that is what has happened at Jalalabad.”[17]
Success of some resistance forces[edit]
The forces of Ahmad Shah Massoud, that were in north to central Afghanistan, controlled the strategically important Salang highway and made steady progress to capture the Bagram airbase just outside Kabul.[17]
After an eleven-year siege, Khost fell to Jalaluddin Haqqani’s troops, that were in east Afghanistan, on April 11, 1991, following a negotiated surrender of the communist garrison.[18]
Attacks by Hekmatyar on other resistance forces[edit]
According to published reports during the 1980s, Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i Islami developed a reputation for attacking other resistance forces, especially those of Ahmad Shah Massoud, and raiding or blocking their food and arms supplies as well as caravans of relief organizations.[19] According to author Steve Coll, Hekmatyar attacked Ahmad Shah Massoud so often that Washington (who was supporting him through Pakistan) “feared he might be a secret KGB plant whose mission was to sow disruption within the anti-communist resistance.”[19] Reports suggest that Hekmatyar’s commanders were saving their men and weapons to establish Hezb-i Islami as the dominant organization once the Soviets departed.[19]
In 1989 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s forces once again conducted an attack on forces of Ahmad Shah Massoud, this time targeting Massoud and the senior leadership of Shura-i Nazar – Massoud’s military and political alliance of 130 northern commanders.[17] While they were not able to kill or injure Massoud, Hekmatyar’s forces killed and tortured to death 30 of Massoud’s men, some of whom were close friends of Massoud.[17] Survivors describe the torture as pulling their eyes out, cutting their ears and noses off, and cutting their stomachs open.[17] Massoud consequently ordered an operation to hunt down the murderers. Shura-i Nazar were able to capture the assassins, but instead of revenge killings, Massoud sent them to Peshawar to have them tried before a court.[17] The courts sentenced them to death.
Ahmad Shah Massoud for the sake of Afghan unity declared: “My message to Hekmatyar’s people is that without a united front we cannot succeed, we cannot achieve anything in Afghanistan.”[17] Roy Gutman of the United States Institute of Peace considered Massoud “the only Afghan leader with an integrated vision”.[14]
Fall of Kabul
With the end of the Soviet Union, Najibullah’s regime lost all credibility and by 1992, after a Russian decision to end fuel shipments to Afghanistan, Najibullah’s regime began to collapse. In April 1992, General Abdul Rashid Dostum defected to the forces of Ahmed Shah Massoud and began to take control of Kabul. On April 14, 1992 it was confirmed that Massoud and his forces had taken Charikar and Jabalussaraj in Parwan province with only minimal fighting.[23]At this point it was reported that Massoud had approximately 20,000 troops stationed around Kabul.[24] It was further reported that the Government’s Second Division had joined Massoud. General Mohammad Nabil Azimi then proceeded to reinforce Bagram Air Base and sent further reinforcements to the outer perimeter of Kabul. By mid-April the air force command at Bagram had capitulated to Massoud. With no army to defend it, Kabul had become completely defenseless.[22]
Najibullah had lost internal control immediately after he announced his willingness on March 18 to resign in order to make way for a neutral interim government. As the government broke into several factions the issue had become how to carry out a transfer of power. Najibullah attempted to flee from Kabul on April 17, but was stopped by Dostum’s troops who controlled Kabul International Airport. Najibullah then took refuge at the United Nations mission where he remained until 1995. A group of Parchami generals and officials declared themselves an interim government for the purpose of handing over power to the dominant and most popular military force: Massoud.[22]
Massoud was hesitant to enter Kabul, waiting for the political parties to reach a peace and power-sharing agreement first. In April 1992, with the Peshawar Accords, an interim government was formed with a Supreme Leadership Council, and a transitory presidency that was given to Sibghatullah Mojaddedi for two months, after which Burhanuddin Rabbani was to succeed him. Hekmatyar was given the post of Prime Minister, but he did not accept this position for he did not want to share power and Pakistan was urging him to take power for himself. Massoud in a recorded conversation tried to convince Hekmatyar to join the peace agreement and not to enter Kabul. But Hekmatyar replied he would enter the capital with “our naked sword. No one can stop us.” Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i Islami forces began to infiltrate Kabul. This forced Massoud to advance on the capital in order to preserve the Peshawar Accords and prevent the establishment of a Hekmatyar dictatorship.[25]
History of Afghanistan 